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This effort is aimed at developing techniques for proving 
that  systems preserve the privacy of information entrusted 
to them. Systems include, for instance, Automated Teller 
Machines, network security protocols, and executable content 
downloaded from the Internet. An important  part  of the re- 
search is developing appropriate notions of provable secrecy 
for this wide range of systems. 
Intuitively, we would regard any system that  outputs our se- 
erects (bindings of certain variables) on a public channel as 
bad. At first glance, then, it might seem like secrecy should 
be regarded as a safety property. But  a system can reveal se- 
crets in ways that  no safety property can treat,  for example, 
through causality or timing variations in the execution of cer- 
tain system components. To treat  these channels, one must 
look beyond safety properties. A recent paper discusses some 
of the fundamental differences between secrecy and safety, in- 
cluding algorithmic distinctions and enforcement techniques 
[Vo199]. 
Our previous work has focused on identifying appropriate no- 
tions of secrecy for different kinds of systems. We have consid- 
ered deterministic systems in [VSI96], nondeterministic sys- 
tems in [SV98], and probabilistic systems in [VS99]. All of 
these notions are forms of Noninterference. For instance, in 
the deterministic case, Noninterference roughly says that  the 
public outputs  of a system are unaffected by changes in pri- 
vate inputs. In the other two cases, it is respectively the possi- 
bility and joint probability distribution of public outputs  that  
are unaffected by these changes [VS98]. 
The different forms of Noninterference fall under the general 
category of information-flow properties. Because they aim for 
absolute secrecy, they cannot be used to formulate useful se- 
crecy criteria for many practical systems. For example, they 
are too strong to characterize secrecy in any system that  au- 
thenticates users with passwords, or that  relies on some sort 
of cryptographic protection like one-way functions. 
Our current research effort aims to identify appropriate cri- 
teria for these kinds of practical systems. For instance, we 
have formulated relative secrecy properties in [VS00] for prov- 
ing the security of a particular password-based system. The 
security proof is an intractability result tha t  applies to any 
adversary expressible as a sequential program. An interesting 
question is whether the same proof technique can be applied 
to systems, like network security protocols, where an adver- 
sary cannot always be characterized as a machine. 
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Introduction 
An extremely time-consuming task of producing an embed- 
ded real-time system is the final analysis and fine-tuning of 
the system's timing. Existing CASE tools focus on the soft- 
ware specification and design of embedded systems. They 
provide little, if any, support  after the software has been im- 
plemented. Even if the developer uses a CASE tool to design 
their system, it likely does not meet the timing specifications 
on the first try. This happens because the CASE tool's soft- 
ware design and real-time analysis is based only on estimated 
data  and idealized models. The tools do not take into ac- 
count practical concerns such as operatin system overhead, 
interrupt handling, limitations of the programming language 
or processor, inaccuracies in estimating worst-case execution 
time of each process, and software errors introduced at  the 
implementation phase by the programmers. 
Performance monitoring tools allow developers to obtain raw 
data from the underlying embedded system in real-time. 
These tools provide most, if not all, of the data  needed to 
pinpoint the problem. Such data,  however, is not provided 
in a symbolic fashion, and thus could be very difficult to 
understand. The monitors only show what happened dur- 
ing run-time, without correlating those results to the original 
specifications. Performance monitors also do not perform any 
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